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The papers at the January 2012 CCRP Research Workshop covered a range of areas in 
both competition policy and the regulation of infrastructure industries.  This special 
section includes three papers on recent regulatory-related discussions in three industries:   
 
(i) aviation – specifically on airport regulation and how it is affected by 
supply-side substitutability; 
 
(ii) water supply – specifically on how to establish a value of water in 
circumstances of current and/or prospective water resource shortages;  and 
 
(iii) electricity – specifically on investment appraisal methods and potential 
regulatory requirements for hydro-pumped storage facilities given the 
growth in intermittent renewable generation. 
 
  
1 Airport Regulation – Paper by Volodymyr Bilotkach and Juergen Mueller 
 
The issue of the economic regulation of airports has attracted the interest of policy 
makers and academics alike in recent years.  A considerable amount of the literature is 
dedicated on the issues surrounding the single and the dual till approaches used in the 
price regulation of airports, including which approach better promotes the interests of 
passengers. However, the question most frequently posed is whether the ex-ante 
regulation of airports is necessary in the first place.  
 
Recently an alternative (albeit for the time being complementary) approach to regulation 
has been slowly forming in the form of constructive engagement.  In the UK, the Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) argues  that there is a good case for seeking to enhance the 
role for airport/airline engagement in shaping and informing the outcome of the airports’ 
review by using the output of Constructive Engagement in 2012. Indeed the latter will be 
one of the key inputs to the CAA's determination of regulation at Heathrow airport after 
2013 in the setting of aeronautical charges including landing charges. This highlights the 
importance of the airport-airline relationship where the airlines who  use the airports and 
pay the charges are well-informed and well-resourced consumers who can negotiate with 
competing airports from a position of similar bargaining strength.  
 
The paper by Bilotkach and Mueller also looks at aviation markets from the point of view 
of the airlines and explores whether there is supply side substitutability that the airlines 
can use to control the potential market power of airports. Importantly, the role of 
passengers is also included in their market definition analysis.  They address this issue by 
differentiating between two different types of passengers: (a) origin-and-destination 
passengers and (b) transfer passengers.  They consider whether these two different types 
of passengers represent different markets in terms of both competing airports and 
geographical boundaries. The focus of their study is the Amsterdam Schiphol airport. 
 
The authors argue that Schiphol airport cannot compensate for the higher charges 
imposed on the first type of passengers by increasing its share of transfer passengers. 
Bilotkach and Mueller offer as evidence for this the imposition of a passenger ticket tax 
in 2008 that applied only to origin-and-destination passengers. They show that, as a result 
of this ticket tax, the airport experienced a heavy loss of such passengers in the second 
half of 2008. However the number of transfer passengers (who were not affected by this 
tax) remained virtually unchanged. This implies that the provision of infrastructure to the 
airlines serving the former type of passengers is, in competition policy terms, a separate 
market from that providing infrastructure to airlines serving transfer passengers. 
 
Using this market definition, they show that the airport faces only modest competition 
from nearby airports as regards the provision of infrastructure to airlines serving origin 
and destination passengers. Similarly, the airport seems to enjoy a dominant position on 
certain segments of the transfer passenger market. However, the existence of substantial 
discounts offered to transfer passengers suggests that the ability of the airport to exercise 
its potential market power in this second market is more limited when compared to that in 
the origin and destination segment. 
 
Overall, Bilotkach and Mueller conclude that large airlines which are the most important 
customers of Schiphol airport have only limited options in terms of available supply side 
competition. 
 
2. Water Supply – Paper by Jon Stern and Jonathan Mirrlees-Black 
 
There has been growing interest in the UK, Australia and elsewhere in the use of market-
based pricing methods in the water supply industry to help address current and 
prospective water shortages.  This is the theme of the paper by Stern and Mirrlees-Black.  
In particular, their paper focuses on how best to establish a ‘value of water’ in 
circumstances where some parts of England and Wales have (or will have) a sufficiently 
high demand for water to cause significant environmental damage in the absence of much 
higher volumes of water imports from water surplus areas – even with  active demand-
side programmes.   
 
The paper suggests that, in the absence of well-functioning upstream water markets, the 
value of water should be set by combining, (a) the estimated forward looking LRMC 
(long-run marginal cost) of water; with, (b) some measure of the scarcity-based water 
abstraction price to cover environmental externalities.  The practical implications of these 
recommendations raise a number of issues, the most important of which are discussed in 
the paper.   
 
As in many other domains, the England and Wales water supply industry operates as a set 
of geographically based vertically integrated companies with exclusive franchise rights in 
their area.  There is little retail competition and no wholesale competition so that trade 
volumes (either in bulk water or in water licenses) are very low.  Introducing a resource 
cost for (raw) water into this framework raises major issues both about the medium term 
industrial, market and pricing structure as well as the structures most appropriate for the 
long-term.   
 
The paper focuses primarily on the medium term (i.e. for the next 10-15 years) and, in 
particular, how best to create strong incentives to current and future industry participants 
to build the right infrastructure at the right price.  For the medium-term, the paper 
recommends the development of a bulk supply tariff (BST) to reflect the marginal costs 
of future water supplies, including scarcity costs, together with a set of network access 
prices and actions to promote inter-company network interconnection.   
 
The paper argues that the partially unbundled proposed model has strong internal 
incentives to develop into a more thorough-going market model like bilateral trading, 
which, in the British context, is likely to be superior in the longer-term.  However, the 
recommended medium-term model can provide a strong basis for developing 
arrangements that foster upstream water competition and trade.  This will help encourage 
the retail competition among non-householder customers which, following the Scottish 
example, the UK government is now proposing to introduce in England.   
 
3. Paper by Bernardo Rangoni 
 
The paper by Rangoni investigates the hydro-pumped storage and assesses whether the 
commissioning of such storage in Italy and Spain was justified.  
 
The existence of storage options is important as a means to face the challenges imposed 
by the increasing penetration of Renewable Energy Resources (RES).  Given their 
intermittent nature, these require increased flexibility for balancing purposes. There are 
different ways of providing for this intermittency: “peaking plants”, demand side 
management, existing grid reinforcement plus the development of smarter grids and 
cross-border interconnections. The final solution is electricity storage which allows the 
holding of energy before it is returned back into the grid at a later time. From the 
different storage technologies currently available, hydro-pumped storage seems to be the 
most mature and cost effective. 
 
According to Rangoni the decision to commission hydro pumped storage (HPS) in Italy 
and Spain has very largely been in response to the increase in RES in both countries from 
major growth in recent years in installed wind and solar PV (photo-voltaic) capacity. This 
has created a need for backup electricity storage capacity.  
 
Testing a market’s ability to deliver HPS capacity is essential as the need to 
“commission” by regulation rather than leaving this to the market competition implies a 
failure of the market to deliver new or upgrade existing HPS. In other words, making a 
case for the construction of such capacity firstly requires a verification that the market 
has failed to deliver new or upgrade existing HPS. In essence we are back to the need for 
a justification of ex ante regulation as in the aviation markets case discussed above.  
 
Rangoni’s estimates suggest that in both countries while a new HPS investment is 
unlikely to recover its costs, the upgrade of existing HPS is likely to do so.  The question 
then becomes whether this will result is sufficient capacity, or whether there is a case for 
building new additional HPS capacity which the markets are unable to deliver through 
commissioning.  In the latter case, there is the question of who should be responsible for 
running such facilities.  
 
For this later case Rangoni argues that there is a need to establish an adequate regulatory 
framework that will periodically either auction the right to operate HPS facilities or 
contract with market participants who will, in turn, sell ancillary services to the TSO at 
regulated tariffs. The latter solution may not be feasible, as the informational 
asymmetries that exist between the TSO and the companies make it very difficult to 
establish the appropriate price regulation regime that will incentivize efficient and cost 
effective delivery. Hence it seems that holding auctions for such new construction is in 
many cases likely to be the most straightforward and cost efficient approach.  
 
Concluding Comment 
 
The rest of this special supplement sets out in full the papers introduced above.   
 
In their different ways, the papers provide a useful perspective on the infrastructure 
industry-related policy issues currently being discussed in Europe.  They also 
demonstrate how the discussion of the nature of specific markets and the scope of 
feasible competition is now increasingly interacting with discussions of regulatory 
mechanism design both in academic discussions and for policy design.  Although there 
are major differences between the industries, there is also much in common between 
them at least as regards the appropriate modes of economic analysis. 
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